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Abstract: How can rational political actors maximize their interests when bargaining through 
representatives?  This project challenges the conventional argument of the canonical principal-
agent and rationalist international relations (IR) bargaining literatures, arguing that the 
importance of constraining representatives’ actions and choices varies depending on the type of 
bargaining process in which they are involved.  I argue that in “cooperative bargaining 
processes”, giving representatives a high degree of autonomy will lead to the maximization of 
interests.  On the other hand, in more “competitive bargaining processes”, constraining one’s 
representatives will lead to the maximization of interests in decision-making outcomes.  Using 
original interview evidence with member state representatives in COREPER, I demonstrate that 
agent autonomy is crucial for the ability of deputy and permanent representatives to forward the 
interests of their principals – the various ministries of their member state – within a cooperative 
bargaining process.     1 
I. Introduction 
How can rational political actors maximize their interests when bargaining through 
representatives?  This project challenges the conventional argument of the canonical principal-
agent and rationalist international relations (IR) bargaining literatures, arguing that the 
importance of constraining representatives’ actions and choices varies depending on the type of 
bargaining process in which they are involved.   
I argue that in “cooperative bargaining processes”, giving representatives a high degree 
of autonomy will lead to the maximization of interests.  On the other hand, in more “competitive 
bargaining processes”, constraining one’s representatives will lead to the maximization of 
interests in decision-making outcomes.   
I will evaluate this argument empirically by examining bargaining among the European 
states in an EU context.  This case allows for the examination of this argument across an array of 
different types of directives, which vary across several alternative explanations of interest.  In 
evaluating this argument, I draw on sixty-six interviews conducted with participants in 
bargaining in the Committee of Permanent Representative (COREPER) – a central institution in 
the EU decision-making structure.  Given the plausibility of this argument demonstrated by this 
empirical analysis, I conclude by specifying potential improvements to build upon the first steps 
taken here in making this argument.   
II. Principal-Agent Framework 
To analyze the level of constraint exerted on representatives by those they represent, I 
draw upon the principal-agent model.  I argue that utilizing a principal-agent framework to 
analyze the institutional relationship between representatives and those they represent as one of 
agent to principals, allows for a more complete understanding of how interests are pursued by   2 
representatives within the decision-making process, as well as making an important contribution 
to this literature by extending it more clearly into institutional settings involving decision-making 
and bargaining processes.  As Pratt and Zeckhauser argue, “whenever one individual depends on 
the action of another, an agency relationship exists (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1984, 2).  Thus, the 
principal-agent model is analytically useful for exploring the role of representatives, as those 
being represented are dependent on the action of their representatives for their interests to be 
reflected in negotiated decision-making outcomes.   
Within the current literature, the principal-agent model is often used to describe an agent 
in terms of a locus of ‘governance’ (Nicolaïdis 1999) – i.e. in the implementation of (rather than 
creation of) political agreements – with an agent often providing some regulatory or ‘incomplete 
contract-fulfilling’ role
1 (e.g. Majone 1996; Pollack 2003).  However, as Jensen and Meckling 
argue, the principal-agent relationship also involves the delegation of some decision-making 
authority to the agent on behalf of the principals (Jensen and Meckling 1976).  It is in this 
decision-making and hence, bargaining, capacity that I utilize the principal-agent model.   
In a principal-agent relationship, principals delegate some authority to an agent to act on 
their behalf (Jensen and Meckling 1976; Pratt and Zeckhauser 1984; Pollack 1997; Pollack 2003; 
McCarty and Meirowitz 2006).  This delegation results in varying degrees of autonomy on the 
part of the agent in their actions taken on behalf of the principals.  However, because the agents 
necessarily have their own interests – part of the assumptions and arguments built into the 
principal-agent model (Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979; Downs and Rocke 1994; Miller 2005) – 
the potential to abuse their autonomy exists, and the principals will institute oversight 
                                                            
1 This is particularly characteristic of the current principal-agent literature on the European Union (e.g. Pollack 
2003).     3 
mechanisms to prevent this abuse (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1984; Downs and Rocke 1994; Macho-
Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001; Pollack 2003). 
The principal-agent model, then, highlights two central variables – ‘the degree of agent 
autonomy’ and ‘principal controls’ – on which I will draw to analyze the institutional positions 
of representatives.  Any principal-agent relationship necessarily possesses these two relational 
dimensions, but vary on the degree to which they are possessed.  I define the degree of agent 
autonomy as “the range of potential independent action available to an agent
2” within the 
decision-making process (i.e. the ability of agents to act autonomously from their principals 
within the decision-making process) and principal controls as the ability of principals to hold 
agents responsible for the observed outcomes of the decision-making process.
3  The degree of 
agent autonomy thus focuses on the degree of control exerted over agents and their actions 
during the decision-making process, while principal controls are similar to the idea of 
sanctioning mechanisms, and play a role after an outcome has been reached.
4   
                                                            
2 This language comes from the definition of ‘autonomy’ used within the principal-agent analysis in the edited 
volume Hawkins, Lake, et al. (2006, p.8).  However, my conceptualization of the defining variables of the principal-
agent relationship differs somewhat from theirs.  Because I am interested in decision-making processes, and thus the 
formation of laws and agreements, the two-stage process of ex ante constraints and ex post controls is central to my 
analysis, because it gets at the difference between the available range of actions to agents within the decision-
making process itself, and the ex post sanctions available to principals based on the agreement that is reached (not 
the actions themselves that are taken by agents) in this process.  In many other settings, this distinction is not as 
important because agreements and laws are not being taken in these settings, and therefore, these two variables are 
often compressed into one variable, such as the ‘autonomy’ variable in the analysis in the edited volume Hawkins, 
Lake, et al. (2006).  However, because constraints within the decision-making process and controls after this process 
based only on the agreement reached can have very different effects on decision-making and the specific actions and 
strategies adopted by agents, the conceptualization of the principal-agent relationship here specifies a difference 
between these two variables.  Comparing the definition of variables here to the variables specified in their edited 
volume, I equate autonomy only with the ‘discretion’ aspect of principals’ controls specified by Hawkins, Lake, et 
al. (2006), and treat the other controls not as another factor in defining the of ‘agent autonomy’ variable, but as 
constituting a separate variable, ‘principals’ controls,’ which I argue plays a different role in impacting agents’ 
actions.  
3 This distinction centers on the informational asymmetry of a principal-agent relationship (Macho-Stadler and 
Pérez-Castrillo 2001).  Because the specific actions taken by agents are often unobservable, and thus only the 
outcome is actually observed – principals can often only hold agents responsible based on observed outcomes rather 
than adopted actions (Downs and Rocke 1994).  This leads to the “principals’ problem” of trying to control agents’ 
actions, as discussed below. 
4 This corresponds to the idea of ex ante and ex post controls discussed by Pollack (2003).  Following the logic of 
creating a single variable to represent autonomy given the degree of principal controls, as in Hawkins, Lake, et al.   4 
The focus on much of the ‘canonical’ principal-agent literature (examining the more 
governance-oriented types of delegation) is in finding solutions to “the principal’s problem” – 
ways to control the actions of agents within the decision-making process itself, and thus limiting 
their autonomy (Holmstrom 1979; Shavell 1979; Downs and Rocke 1994; Epstein and 
O'Halloran 1994; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001; Bergin 2005; Miller 2005; McCarty 
and Meirowitz 2006).  This literature often focuses on the manipulation of incentive mechanisms 
(e.g. Shavell 1979; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001) and procedural mechanisms (e.g. 
McCubbins, Noll et al. 1987) as ways to control agents in institutional settings where principals 
cannot directly control and monitor agents.   
However, outside of the more canonical approach, some principal-agent analysis has 
focused on the principal’s “other problem” – in particular, problems of the principal’s moral 
hazard and credible commitment (e.g. Schelling 1960; North and Weingast 1989; Kiewiet and 
McCubbins 1991; Martin 1992a; Mayer 1995; Stone 2002; Keefer and Stasavage 2003; Pollack 
2006).  From this perspective, “it is possible for the principal’s pursuit of her own self-interest to 
be self-destructive” (Miller 2005) – leading to inabilities to make credible commitments and 
carry out decisions which may lead to greater overall efficiency exist.   
I argue that a similar type of negative relationship between tight principal control and the 
representation of interests and efficiency in “cooperative bargaining processes”.  Principals 
whose agents are tightly controlled to concentrate on and pursue only the principals’ narrow 
conception of their own self-interest may lose many possible gains from agreements, often 
leading to the inefficiency of decision-making outcomes. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
(2006), I taken into account the fact that ex post may serve as a potential ex ante constraint by impacting agents’ 
expectations of future actions by the principal.  In order to capture this potential effect, in operationalizing ‘agent 
autonomy’ I include a consideration of the agent’s perception of her own autonomy.  This is not the same as 
principal controls, but captures ex ante effects they may have on agents’ actions within the decision-making process.   5 
In making this argument, I first define a “cooperative bargaining process” and fit that 
conceptualization into the current literature.  I then argue that in these “cooperative bargaining 
processes”, rather than constraining agents, giving agents autonomy will lead to a greater 
representation of principals’ interests in outcomes.  I then present discuss the operationalization 
of these concepts, and then utilize a case of decision-making in the European Union to highlight 
this argument at work.   
III. Conceptualizing “Cooperative Bargaining” 
‘Cooperative bargaining’ refers to the cooperative character of the strategic interaction 
that takes place in the decision-making process.   Most definitions and conceptualizations of 
cooperation in a bargaining/decision-setting are focused on the reaching of an agreement 
((Myerson 1991; Young 1991; Sebenius 1992a; Fearon 1995; Muthoo 1999) – i.e. “coordinating 
on one of the possible equilibrium outcomes” of a bargaining process (Krasner 1991) – or on the 
time it takes to reach an agreement (Fearon 1998).   
It is also important, though, to examine cooperation in terms of the character of 
interactions that take place among the actors in the negotiation of a joint agreement.  This is 
because different types of interactions, I argue, require different types of actions on the part of 
negotiators in order to have the interests they represent reflected in outcomes, which in turn has 
important implications of for principal-agent relationships. I take defining this cooperation to 
task in this section, and then relate the conceptualization here into current literature on different 
bargaining processes. 
III.A. “Cooperative Bargaining” 
Though cooperation is an important aspect of domestic decision-making, and of coalition 
formation in particular, the international relations (IR) literature has devoted extensive analysis   6 
to defining and analyzing cooperation, and thus it is this literature upon which I draw to define a 
process of “cooperative bargaining”.     
  Now an accepted standard in the IR literature, Robert Keohane (1984) defined 
cooperation as actors’ mutual adjustment of policies which are in conflict to bring them into 
conformity with one another.
5  While this definition describes the enforcement phase of 
cooperation through policy adjustment, its defining feature of ‘mutual adjustment’ in the face of 
conflicting interests is generalizable across multiple types of cooperation.  I build upon this 
general definition to derive a more detailed definition of “cooperative bargaining” which can be 
applied to bargaining processes and the character of the interactions within that process. 
  Following this general “mutual adjustment” definition, cooperation within a bargaining 
process – “cooperative bargaining” – is defined here as “working or acting together willingly for 
a common purpose or benefit in the presence of conflicting interests”.  This definition thus 
captures the presence of conflicting interests, the idea of bringing actors’ actions into 
‘conformity’ with the idea of a “common purpose or benefit” and the idea of “mutual 
adjustment” with the idea of “willingly working or acting together”.   
   As will be discussed in more detail later, the observable evidence of ‘cooperative 
bargaining’ is connected to the nature of the offers made by the parties.  “Cooperative 
bargaining” is characterized by a series of offers that would be Pareto-superior to the status quo 
for those players not making the offer.  Empirically, it will be characterized by the willing 
offering of concessions (or, potentially, by an offer that is status-quo improving for both (all) 
players
6).  On the other hand, “competitive (or “non-cooperative”) bargaining” tactics will be 
                                                            
5 See discussion on p. 51-54 for description of this definition.  See (Milner 1992) for defense of the claim that there 
is a ‘consensus’ on this definition. 
6 This type of offer would still be Pareto-superior for the parties not making the offer, and thus fits the cooperative 
bargaining definition.  It is possible, of course, that an offer that is made, while Pareto-superior for parties not   7 
characterized by proposals that are not Pareto-superior to the status quo for the other player(s) – 
in other words, by “threats”.  These two ideal types can be used to construct a scale by weighting 
and coding different offers to yield a categorization of each bargaining process along a 
continuum with cooperative and competitive bargaining as ideal types at the opposite poles.   
It is the degree of “cooperative bargaining” (as defined in this way) that this project seeks 
to explain.  This project further provides an argument for how cooperative bargaining can be 
fostered in the face of actors’ conflicting interests in order to achieve long-term, as well as short-
term cooperation among the actors.    
  Given these two different conceptions of cooperation in a bargaining setting, and the 
importance of distinguishing between them, I use the current term in the literature “bargaining 
cooperation” to refer to the reaching of a joint agreement and the term “cooperative bargaining” 
– the dependent variable in this analysis – to refer to the cooperative character of the bargaining 
process.  
III.B. Cooperative Bargaining and the Integrative Bargaining Literature 
  A note should be made that this definition of cooperative bargaining largely parallels the 
concept of ‘integrative bargaining’ (Walton and McKersie 1965; Lax and Sebenius 1986; 
Susskind and Cruikshank 1987; Kublin 1995).
7   Thus, the analysis presented here can largely be 
interpreted to explain how we bring about an ‘integrative bargaining’ process – as it is 
conceptualized in much of the literature.
8  However, for several reasons, I adopt the concept of 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
making the offer, may also be a Pareto-improvement for the party that is making the offer.  For more on this type of 
cooperative bargaining move, see discussions of ‘bridging tactics’ (Pruitt 1981).  This type of bargaining move is 
not required by the definition of cooperative bargaining, but is merely a subset of cooperative bargaining moves in 
general.   
7 ‘Integrative bargaining’ is also sometimes referred to in the literature as ‘problem-solving.’  For examples of this 
usage, see (Hopmann 1995; Elgström and Jönsson 2000).  See (Pruitt and Rubin 1986) for the connection between 
these two terms.   
8 For examples of a conceptualization of ‘integrative bargaining’ that largely parallels this ‘cooperative bargaining’ 
concept, see (Hopmann 1995).   8 
‘cooperative’ rather than ‘integrative’ bargaining.  A discussion of these reasons, and how the 
concept of ‘cooperative bargaining’ relates to ‘integrative bargaining is helpful not to highlight 
how this concept relates to the commonly used concept of ‘integrative bargaining’ in the current 
literature, as well as to better highlight the facets of a cooperative bargaining process.   
I adopt the concept of ‘cooperative’ rather than ‘integrative bargaining’ largely to deal 
with two issues with the concept of ‘integrative bargaining’ as it exists in the current literature.  
First, the concept of ‘integrative bargaining’ carries with it concept carries with it a large deal of 
normative baggage that I do not want to have clouding my argument.  My argument itself is 
agnostic about whether one ‘should’ or ‘should not’ engage in integrative bargaining, and is 
merely an argument about the conditions under which we will see ‘cooperative’ (‘integrative’) 
types of bargaining processes and the implications this has for long-term cooperation.  This 
argument may be of use for those who want to make these normative arguments, but I do not 
want to get into this issue, or to have it clouding the argument that I am making. 
Second, and most importantly, as highlighted by Otomar Bartos (Bartos 1995), “different 
writers have somewhat different ideas about what this approach, [integrative bargaining], entails 
and give it somewhat different names” (Bartos 1995, 50).  The concept of ‘integrative 
bargaining’ has several different meanings and interpretations in the various literatures in which 
it is used, and all of these meanings do not necessarily correspond to what I am attempting to 
explain in my argument.  I thus introduce the term ‘cooperative bargaining’ to capture particular 
facets of ‘integrative bargaining’, without implying the other meanings which are associated with 
it.   
First, integrative bargaining is sometimes used to categorize a situation defined by the 
process that is taking place, but is sometimes used to define the constellation of interests   9 
surrounding a bargain – where ‘integrative bargaining’ is any situation in which common 
interests exist, and the process that takes place may or may not correspond to the integrative 
bargaining processes discussed elsewhere in the literature (e.g. Goldman & Rojot 2003).   
My interest is in the process that takes place, and I adopt the definition of a ‘bargaining 
situation’ that is common in the literature which defines a bargaining situation as one in which 
both common and conflicting interests both exist.  The real focus, then, is whether the conflicting 
interests are the sole focus of the bargaining process or whether this conflicting interest can be 
overcome in order to allow a focus on the common interests as well.  It is this distinction that 
separates my conception of ‘cooperative’ bargaining from ‘competitive’ (non-cooperative) 
bargaining.   
  Second, ‘integrative bargaining’ is sometimes contrasted with ‘competitive’ bargaining 
and sometimes with ‘distributive’ bargaining.  ‘Distributive’ bargaining is not necessarily the 
antithesis of what I am arguing is ‘cooperative’ bargaining.  In a ‘distributive’ bargain, the focus 
is on movement along a single ‘bargaining space’ continuum.  However, this does not 
necessarily mean that ‘competitive’ processes will result.  In particular, cooperative behavior can 
still be present in this type of situation, most notably in the offering of concessions (Bartos 1995; 
Druckman and Mitchell 1995).  In addition, the distribution of gains from a bargaining process 
will always be a part of bargaining (Lax and Sebenius 1986; Sebenius 1992a; Sebenius 1992b).  
So of interest in this project is the character of process that we see characterizing the bargain 
overall – competitive or cooperative. 
Overall, ‘integrative bargaining’ is often used to mean several different things – joint 
problem-solving (Walton and McKersie 1965; Pruitt 1981; Elgström and Jönsson 2000), 
bargaining that involves ‘search behavior’ (Bartos 1995), multi-issue negotiations (Riaffa 1982;   10 
Gupta 1989), any bargain with common interests (Goldman and Rojot 2003), bargaining focused 
on common interests (Lax and Sebenius 1986; Elgström and Jönsson 2000), ‘creative’ 
negotiation processes (Basadur, Pringle et al. 2000; Elgström and Jönsson 2000), ‘bridging’ 
behavior (Pruitt 1981), a consensus focus (Lewis 2003), positive-sum (v. 0-sum) orientation (Lax 
and Sebenius 1986; Elgström and Jönsson 2000), focus on absolute (v. relative) gains (Hopmann 
1995), the existence of a desire to reach agreement (Lax and Sebenius 1986), etc.  So I want to 
choose a concept – ‘cooperative bargaining’ that is more clear in precisely what is (and is not) 
meant by the term, rather than implicitly implying these different definitions by the adoption of 
the term ‘integrative bargaining’, depending on the orientation of the reader. 
For these reasons, then, while ‘cooperative bargaining’ largely parallels the ‘integrative 
bargaining’ concept, I chose to more specifically define what ‘cooperative’ bargaining entails, 
and how it relates (and does not relate) to the different meanings and implications of ‘integrative 
bargaining in the literatures.  I thus adopt the conceptualization of ‘cooperative bargaining’ 
versus ‘competitive bargaining’ (or ‘non-cooperative bargaining’), though aspects of the 
‘integrative bargaining’ can be captured by this ‘cooperative bargaining’ concept.   
IV. Agent autonomy and “Cooperative” versus “Competitive” Bargaining 
Drawing on this conceptualization of cooperative versus competitive bargaining 
processes, I argue that in the context of principal controls, agent autonomy is important for the 
fulfillment of principals’ interests in a cooperative bargaining process while agential constraint is 
important for interest fulfillment in competitive bargaining processes.   
The existence of principal controls provides a type of sanctioning mechanism based on 
the agreement reached among the negotiating agents.  Though these controls are not explicitly 
linked to agents’ actions and strategies within the bargaining process, they provide a way to   11 
ensure that whatever actions and strategies are adopted by negotiating agents, they are largely in 
pursuit of the principals’ interests, rather than the interest of the agents.  Within this context, 
then, I argue that giving agents autonomy to choose their actions and strategies is important in 
cooperative bargaining processes, while constraining them is important in competitive 
bargaining processes.   
In particular, agent autonomy is important in order for two important types of actions to 
be taken by negotiating agents, based on this substantive knowledge.  First, autonomy allows for 
the sharing of information about the interests, perspectives and problems underlying stated 
positions between the agents involved in the bargaining process from which an understanding of 
each others’ underlying interests can develop.  Second, autonomy allows negotiating agents to 
more easily ‘give’ on certain issues in a bargain.   
Consistent with the predictions of prospect theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979), which 
argues that rational actors will be risk-averse with respect to gains, but risk-averse with respect to 
losses, I argue that principals who do not have substantive information and experience in 
bargaining situations often treat all bargaining settings as involving ‘competitive’ bargaining 
processes.  They often, therefore, act in a risk-averse way with respect to information-sharing 
and bargaining strategies.  Given this risk-averse stance, principals thus first prefer to protect 
their private information about their weaknesses and true interests.  An agent tightly constrained 
would therefore be prevented from engaging in the sharing of such information.   
In addition, acting in a way consistent with this risk-aversion with respect to bargaining 
loss, principals approach bargaining with a ‘competitive’ orientation.  Engaging in competitive 
bargaining strategies in either a competitive or cooperative bargaining process may result in less 
severe losses than engaging in cooperative bargaining in a competitive bargaining process.    12 
Therefore, the risk-averse principal will likely treat every bargaining setting in a competitively-
oriented manner.  This is especially likely in the international realm, where relative gains 
concerns may dominate states’ orientation toward bargaining (Waltz 1979; Grieco 1988; 
Hopmann 1995).   
Agent autonomy is important, I argue, because it allows agents to act on their substantive 
knowledge and experience in bargaining processes.  In particular, because agents are 
participating in the bargaining process, they can identify the character of the interaction taking 
place, within what are often closed-door settings (Stasavage 2004).  They can therefore utilize 
their autonomy to tailor their bargaining strategies to the process at hand.  Thus, in cooperative 
bargaining processes, an agent with autonomy can share information about the interests 
underlying a bargain, and to be able to “give” on certain issues.  
As defined above, cooperative bargaining, which is centered around the idea that 
bargaining agents “give” on some issues in order to “gain” on issues that are more central to their 
interests.   The sharing of information is an important step which must precede this bargaining 
process, because it allows the bargaining agents to identify where potential trade-offs among 
issues lie.  If bargaining agents do not know which issues are more important to the other actors 
in relation to their own interests, the identification of the particular issues on which to “give” is 
more difficult (Goldman and Rojot 2003, 53).  This is compounded by the fact that principals 
may often not only want to not share information about their interests, but also to strategically 
misrepresent those interests (Myerson 1979; Myerson and Satterthwaite 1983; Myerson 1984; 
Myerson 1991; Talley 1994).  Thus, the information sharing allowed by agent autonomy is 
important for agents to be able to participate and reap the gains of cooperative bargaining 
interactions among the negotiating actors.   13 
Furthermore, willingly offering concessions – i.e. “giving” – on some issues in a bargain 
is a defining feature of cooperative bargaining.  This is also something that requires autonomy on 
the part of the agent.  Given the principals’ risk-averse orientation to bargaining losses, they are 
often unwilling to give on any issue in a bargain, even those not central to their interests, in order 
to avoid appearing ‘weak’ (Morrow 1992) and therefore potentially leading to “losing” on issues 
of more importance as well.  Furthermore, the competitive orientation that stems from this risk 
aversion with respect to bargaining losses also leads to a general unwillingness to offer 
concessions in a bargaining process. 
Autonomy is thus again highlighted as a central factor for bargaining actors to participate 
in cooperative bargaining.  Bargaining agents who have autonomy are thus expected to utilize 
their substantive knowledge and past experiences to identify cooperative bargaining situations, 
and in these situations to share information about their principals’ underlying interests and 
participate in the cooperative bargaining process by offering concessions on some issues 
included in the bargain.   
By participating in this cooperative bargaining process, agents are able to best achieve 
their principals’ interests in these situations by having their overall interests reflected in what are 
largely Pareto-superior outcomes to those produced by competitive bargaining, given the nature 
of the offers which embody cooperative bargaining.  In other words, they are able to achieve 
agreements closer to their principals’ interests on issues more central to those interests than they 
would in competitive bargaining on those issues, while offering Pareto-superior agreements to 
opponent bargaining agents on other issues which are of less importance to their principals’ 
interests.  They are thus able to gain more overall and better achieve their principals’ interests in 
bargaining outcomes.     14 
Conversely, though, I argue that tightly constraining an agent will best achieve the 
reflection of principals’ interests in the agreements reached in competitive bargaining processes.  
Given their substantive knowledge, agents are able to identify competitive bargaining situations 
and adjust their bargaining strategies accordingly, as they do in cooperative bargaining 
processes.  In addition, the existence of principal controls will help to ensure that the strategies 
these agents adopt will be largely consistent with the principals’ interests.  However, given that 
agents also possess their own particular interests, the threats associated with and adopted in 
competitive bargaining processes can often not be made credibly by agents with a large degree of 
autonomy.   
Agents have their own interests, separate from those of their principals (e.g. Pollack 
2003; Miller 2005).  In bargaining settings, these types of interests often involve an interest in 
reaching agreements as well as interests in the relationships that they develop with other 
negotiators (Lax and Sebenius 1986).  Given these interests, the threats of reversion and 
misrepresentation of interest can not be made credibly by agents with these interests.  When the 
time comes to carry through with those threats, it will not be in their own interest to do so – even 
though it is also in their interests to further their principals’ interests.   
Tightly constraining agents in competitive bargaining situations can therefore lend these 
threats credibility – and therefore help them to be effective bargaining strategies in these 
competitive bargaining processes (Schelling 1960).  This credibility stems from the fact that 
tightly controlled agents facing principal controls are often unable to act against the principals’ 
specific instructions and positions.  Most importantly, principals’ interests do not suffer from this 
credibility problem.  The interests of principals are often not as focused on the reaching of an 
agreement, in and of itself.  Even though an agreement may be in their interests in the ‘absolute   15 
gains’ sense, the internal coordination among multiple principals (Babbitt 1999) or the 
importance of relative gains versus absolute gains (Mearsheimer 1994/95; Hopmann 1995) will 
often have any interest they have in reaching an agreement, in and of itself, trumped by these 
other factors.  Furthermore, principals do not possess the same type of relationship interests that 
negotiating agents do.  The principals themselves are often not engaged in strategic and 
interpersonal relationships among themselves.  Their instructions and interests are therefore often 
separate from these types of relationship interests.   
Given these interests, instructions from these principals can therefore make credible 
threats.  Thus, tightly constraining agents in competitive bargaining situations can therefore be 
used to credibly engage in the tactics associated with and successful in competitive bargaining 
processes.   
Therefore, challenging the conventional argument of the canonical principal-agent and 
rationalist international relations (IR) bargaining literatures, arguing that the importance of 
constraining representatives’ actions and choices varies depending on the type of bargaining 
process in which they are involved.   
In cooperative bargaining processes, giving representatives a high degree of autonomy 
will allow agents to adopt the strategies necessary to successfully have interests represent in the 
outcomes of this type of bargaining.  On the other hand, in competitive bargaining processes, 
constraining one’s representatives will lend credibility and therefore, effectiveness, to the 
strategies associated with success in these types of interactions.     
IV.A. Testable Hypotheses 
This argument, then, leads to the following testable hypotheses.  I expect that, in the 
context of principals’ controls: (1) In “cooperative” bargaining processes, holding all else   16 
constant, an increase in agent autonomy will lead to an increase in the reflection of the 
principals’ interests in the bargaining agreements reached.  (2) In “competitive” bargaining 
processes, consistent with the bargaining power and principal-agent literatures, holding all else 
constant, decreasing the level of agent autonomy (i.e. constraining agents) will lead to a greater 
reflection of principals’ interests in outcomes.   
These hypotheses can be empirically tested in order to evaluate the argument made here.  
To do so, though, the concepts of agent autonomy, principal controls, and cooperative bargaining 
need to be operationalized so that these concepts can be theoretically analyzed and empirically 
observed.   
V. Operationalization of Central Concepts 
V.A. ‘Cooperative Bargaining’ Operationalized 
As defined above, ‘cooperative bargaining’ refers to “working or acting together 
willingly for a common purpose or benefit in the presence of conflicting interests”.  The 
observable empirical evidence of cooperative bargaining has to do with the nature of the offers 
that are made and observed.  Offers that are Pareto-improving for parties other than the offerer 
constitute evidence for cooperative bargaining; refusal to make any concessions even in the face 
of others’ concessions, tactics aimed at avoiding the need to make concessions, and threats of 
reversion constitute evidence of competitive bargaining.   
“Cooperative bargaining” is characterized by a series of offers that would be Pareto-
superior to the status quo for those players not making the offer.  Empirically, it will be 
characterized by the willing offering of concessions (or, potentially, by an offer that is status-quo 
improving for both (or all) players
9) – and thus will not be a bargaining process in which 
                                                            
9 This type of offer would still be Pareto-superior for the parties not making the offer, and thus fits the cooperative 
bargaining definition.  It is possible, of course, that an offer that is made, while Pareto-superior for parties not   17 
bargaining power plays a central role.  These types of cooperative moves can be present, even in 
a ‘distributive’ type of bargaining situation (i.e. one-dimensional with conflicting interests) (e.g. 
Bartos 1995; Druckman and Mitchell 1995).  These concessions can be specific trades or 
nonspecific.  In other words, the trade of concessions can be linked to specific concessions in 
return or they can be made without the expectation of a specific reciprocal concession, but with 
the idea that concessions will be made in some way at some point in the future (i.e. diffuse 
reciprocity).
10   
The important factor in the observation and measurement of this aspect of cooperative 
bargaining would be the importance of ‘willingness’.  Concessions brought about by coercive 
moves such as threats, or strategically misrepresented information would not be aspects of a 
‘cooperative’ bargaining process.  Thus, the lack of these factors is important.  The presence of 
these types of factors is evidence of ‘competitive’ bargaining.   
“Competitive (or “non-cooperative”) bargaining” tactics will be characterized by offers 
("threats") that are not Pareto-superior to the status quo for the other player(s).  Empirically, the 
use of ‘threats’ and the use of other types of tactics designed to elicit unwilling concessions from 
the other party – in other words, the use and exploitation of “bargaining power” – will 
characterize competitive bargaining.  In addition, given the lack of willing concessions in this 
type of bargaining, tactics designed to help prevent oneself from making of concessions will 
characterize “non-cooperative” types of processes.  Thus, threatening reversion to a worse point 
than the status quo absent concessions, exploiting bargaining power, or seeking to construct a 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
making the offer, may also be a Pareto-improvement for the party that is making the offer.  For more on this type of 
cooperative bargaining move, see discussions of ‘bridging tactics’ (Pruitt 1981).  However, this type of bargaining 
move is not required by the definition of cooperative bargaining, but is a subset of cooperative bargaining moves in 
general.   
10 For discussions of ‘diffuse reciprocity’ see (Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Lewis 2000; Lewis 2005).   18 
winning coalition that leaves some party or parties (outside of the coalition) worse off than 
before the agreement constitute evidence of competitive bargaining.   
In addition, the manipulation of private information designed to prevent oneself from 
making concessions and eliciting concessions from others also constitute evidence of 
competitive bargaining.  Thus, the manipulation of private information in ‘non-cooperative 
bargaining’, including commitments, threats, promises, moves to alter the perception of one’s 
“best alternative to a negotiated agreement” (referred to as the BATNA), moves to alter the 
others’ perception of their own BATNA, and moves to force the other to reveal his/her interests 
would also indicate evidence competitive bargaining (Walton and McKersie 1965; Lax and 
Sebenius 1986).  
Using these two characterizations of cooperative and competitive (non-cooperative) types 
of bargaining, the tactics of the negotiators involved in a bargaining process can be coded as 
more or less ‘cooperative.’  Combining these together, an aggregate measure of the degree of 
cooperation displayed within a bargaining process can be made by weighting and coding 
different offers.  This will create a continuum, with ‘cooperative’ and ‘competitive’ bargaining 
as ideal types – the end-points of the poles as discussed by Gary Goertz (2006).
11  This “degree 
of cooperative bargaining” creates different ‘institutional’ settings in which I argue that different 
degrees of constraint exerted over agents will lead to the maximization of interest in bargaining 
outcomes.    
V.B.: Operationalization of the ‘Degree of Agent autonomy’ 
The degree of ‘agent autonomy’ refers to the “range of independent action” allotted to the 
agent by the principal (Hawkins, Lake et al. 2006, 8) within the decision-making process – with 
greater degrees of agent autonomy categorized as ‘agent autonomy’ and lesser degrees 
                                                            
11 See discussion on p.30-35.   19 
categorized as ‘agential constraint’.  Operationally, the degree of agent autonomy embodies three 
types of observable factors – formal, institutionalized constraints, de facto constraints, and the 
perception that representatives have of the constraints placed on them.  In terms of formal 
constraints, we can look to the explicit or ‘contractual’ delegation of power to agents to examine 
how much authority they have to take decisions on behalf of their principals.  Can the principals 
veto a decision taken by the agents?  In an international setting, does the agent have 
plenipotentiary powers (the ability to take decisions on behalf of the state)? 
In terms of de facto constraints, the various ways that principals can exert control over 
the agents’ actions within the decision-making process should be taken into account.  First, an 
agent with a high degree of autonomy will have input into the instructions they receive from their 
principals.  This can take the form of involvement in the instruction process, or the lack of an 
explicit instruction process, in which the expectations for agents’ actions are laid out.  This may 
be especially relevant in situations of multiple principals.
12  In situations where disagreement 
exists between the principals, agents often play a role in coordinating the interests of the various 
principals, thus having input into the instructions they receive (Cutcher-Gershenfeld and Watkins 
1999).  Second, and relatedly, a high degree of agent autonomy is characterized by actions taken 
by agents within the bargaining process that deviate from explicit instructions, or actions taken 
without direct instructions.  In situations of multiple principals, this may again be more 
prevalent, because agents are often perceived as being neutral with respected to the political 
battle taking place among these principals (Moe 1987b).  They thus may be given greater leeway 
in deviating from instructions or not given instructions.  Finally, a high degree of agent 
                                                            
12 For explicit discussions of the effect of multiple principals, see (Sebenius 1983; Moe 1984; Moe 1987a; Moe 
1987b; Babbitt 1999; Nicolaïdis 1999; Miller 2005).  The existence of multiple principals does not affect the 
fundamentals of the argument being forwarded here, but may play a role in affecting the level of autonomy that 
agents are given.  Additionally, evaluating the ‘overall’ interests of the principals may be more difficult in situations 
where they possess different interests.  It thus raises important implications for the coding of these variables, and 
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autonomy is characterized by the holding of private information by the agents, which may be 
shared with the principals or withheld, the use of this private information within the bargaining 
process, and the sharing of the private information of principals with other agents.   
Finally, the level of autonomy that agents perceive themselves as having is another 
important factor to measure.
13  This is because despite the formal and de facto constraints on 
agents, their perception of how much autonomy they have may be an important influence in 
further constraining their actions, or possibly in leading them to adopt actions that exceed what 
their constraining principals may intend.  While this is difficult to measure reliably, because it 
requires self-reporting, that does not mean that this conceptual facet should be dismissed, and 
this information can be elicited through interview or survey work. 
Where these factors, or several of these factors, are identified, I argue that the 
institutional relationship between principal and agent is characterized by a high degree of agent 
autonomy, which I refer to as ‘agent autonomy.’  Where these factors are not present, or very 
few of these factors are present, I argue that the institutional relationship is characterized by 
lower degrees of autonomy, or what I refer to here for discussion purposes, as ‘agential 
constraint.’  In actuality, agent autonomy is a continuum and while the theory is laid out in terms 
of either/or, in reality, and in coding this variable and testing this argument, it will be treated as a 
categorical, ordered variable overlying an underlying continuum. 
V.C.: Principals’ Controls Operationalized 
The concept of ‘principals’ controls’ refers to the ability of principals to hold agents 
responsible for the outcomes of their actions taken within the decision-making process.  It is 
                                                            
13 This perception of autonomy may capture ex ante effects that ex post principals’ controls may exert.  Because 
though, these controls may or may not exert ex ante effects, this aspect of autonomy is conceptually distinct from the 
principals’ controls themselves, for the reasons laid out above.  This is designed merely to capture the possible ex 
ante effects that these controls may exert.     21 
conceptually distinct from the degree of agent autonomy in that it does not refer to the agents’ 
actions within the bargaining process, but to the ability of the principal to sanction the agent after 
the fact.  If agents abuse the autonomy that they have in the bargaining process to engage in 
‘shirking’ - pursuing their own self-interest at the expense of their principals’ interests – and the 
bargaining outcomes reflect this, the principals can sanction or remove the agent.  Thus, the 
effect of principals’ controls is to prevent agents’ use of high degrees of autonomy to engage in 
‘shirking.’  This mechanism is thus conceptually distinct from agent autonomy, as discussed 
above, which refers to explicit hindrances on the actions taken by agents within the bargaining 
process of decision-making.     
This concept is operationally characterized, first, by a short term of appointment to the 
agential position and second, by the type of selection mechanism principals use to choose their 
agents, such as election, appointment, or appointment with a confirmation mechanism.  The 
more direct the appointment mechanism and the more frequently it occurs, the greater the ability 
of principals to use "continuance or renewal of the appointment" to hold an agent responsible.
14  
Most importantly, the concept of principals’ controls is characterized by the ability of principals 
to sanction agents or their ability to override a decision taken by agents, if they do not support 
them. 
VI. Alternative Explanations 
While I argue that it is the autonomy of agents in “cooperative bargaining” processes and 
the constraint of agents in “competitive bargaining” processes that lead to the maximization of 
interests, there are several other possible explanations for variation in the representation of 
interests in bargaining outcomes.   
                                                            
14 In cases of representative positions which may not be as favorably viewed, or are viewed as stepping stones to 
something more prestigious, the future appointments or elections to other institutions may be used in a similar way.   22 
First, the potential influence of political culture on the adoption of different types of 
bargaining strategies should be considered.  Political culture has been show to be an important 
factor in explaining the behaviors adopted within the political life of a state (Pye and Verba 
1965; Benedicto 2004).  Some political cultures may simply be more cooperatively oriented, 
while others may be more individualistic and competitive, and this difference in culture, rather 
than variation in agents’ autonomy may explain agents’ decision-making strategies and thus the 
degree of interest maximization in bargaining outcomes.  Thus, the political culture from which 
an agent comes is an important factor that needs to be controlled for in order to have confidence 
in any relationship found between agent autonomy and the character of the strategies the agent 
adopts, representing her principals’ interests in a decision-making, interest-aggregation setting.   
Second, the power of the different principals involved in a decision-making process may 
lead to the adoption of ‘competitive bargaining strategies.’  Since relative power – i.e. relative 
bargaining power – often conceptualized in terms of a state’s size and resources in the 
international relations literature examining the importance of power in decision-making 
processes – is the most important factor in the maximization of interests in a zero-sum, 
distributionally oriented, competitive bargain, states with the most power can expect to gain the 
most from this type of bargain, and thus will be more likely than small states to adopt these types 
of bargaining strategies, as well as to have their interest maximized through the use of such 
strategies.  Therefore, controlling for the relative size and power of principals is important in 
order to empirically assess the argument presented here. 
Third, the level of politicization of decisions being negotiated may influence the behavior 
adopted by representatives and thus the way that interests are ultimately reflected in negotiated 
outcomes.  For example, on issues that are highly politicized, representative agents may be   23 
unwilling to compromise on narrow self-interest of their principals, while on issues of lesser 
politicization they may be more willing to compromise.  This may be due to the level of publicity 
and public scrutiny attached to more politicized issues (Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Stasavage 
2004) and/or possible reputational concerns arising with being identified as ‘giving’ on these 
types of issues.
15  Therefore, competitive strategies and lowest common denominator outcomes 
may be expected on highly politicized issues, but integrative strategies and agreements above the 
lowest common denominator may be more likely on issues with a low level of politicization, and 
thus this politicization factor needs to be controlled for in the analysis of the argument presented 
here.   
Fourth, the type of voting rule used to take a decision may also govern the type of 
strategies chosen by agents and thus, the way interests are reflected in outcomes.  Where 
unanimity is the voting rule, each representative possesses the ability to veto a negotiated 
agreement.  In these types of decision-making settings, agents may be less willing and likely to 
engage in cooperative, compromising ‘integrative’ strategies where ‘they don’t have to’ (e.g. 
Scharpf 1998; Elgström and Jönsson 2000; Michalak 2001).   
In addition, this type of decision-making setting may be viewed by agents as giving them 
more ‘leverage’ for competitive tactics (Krasner 1991), and may therefore lead to the adoption of 
more competitive strategies within the decision-making process.  Under a voting rule where not 
all representatives have to agree for a decision to be taken, the veto cannot be used to the same 
degree to influence an outcome, and thus competitive strategies may be less likely, first, because 
the leverage of the veto is absent, and second, reputational concerns may be a factor in coalition 
formation, where agents who are seen as uncooperative may isolate themselves from 
                                                            
15 In some issues, politicization may also bring strong partisan preferences into the decision-making process, which 
may also lead to less willingness to compromise on these issues.     24 
consideration in the formation of these coalitions (Riaffa 1982; Sebenius 1983; Lax and Sebenius 
1991; Moravcsik 1993, 502-504).   
Furthermore, in order to create a coalition large enough to vote for an agreement under 
this type of voting rule, consideration of others’ interests, and issue trade-off – all ‘integrative,’ 
cooperative tactics – may be seen as tools to form this winning coalition.  The voting rule, 
another potential explanation for the relationships posited, thus needs to be controlled for to have 
confidence in any findings supporting an explanation stemming from the role of agent autonomy. 
Finally, different issue areas may foster different types of bargaining strategies.  Issue 
areas more politically sensitive or more oriented toward ‘high’ politics (Waltz 1979) may lead to 
different, and more competitively-oriented types of bargaining strategies (because they are more 
egoistic and individually oriented in such situations) than more ‘technocratic’ or economic issue 
areas – and thus ‘technocratic’ issue areas are more likely to foster cooperation (Waltz 1979; 
Lipson 1984; Krasner 1991).  That this is expected even within the context of the EU can be seen 
in arguments that the EU competence should expand and create ‘spill-over’ effects in the more 
technocratic issue areas, but not necessarily the more ‘high politics’ issues (Haas 1958; Stone 
Sweet and Sandholtz 1997).   
All of these alternatives provide an explanation for the same behavior and outcomes 
predicted by the autonomy and cooperative bargaining theory predicted above.  Therefore, in the 
construction of the research design and choice of cases, these alternatives need to be carefully 
considered. 
VII. Case Selection and Methodology 
In evaluating this theory empirically, careful case selection is important because of the 
nature of the topic – i.e. that information on all decision-making processes cannot be obtained.  I   25 
thus chose to analyze decision-making in the European Union (EU).  First, the EU is an 
international decision-making setting, and one in which the need for tight constraints over state 
representatives
16 are generally argued to apply.  Thus, the EU stems from a category of ‘least-
likely’ cases (Eckstein 1975) for an argument about the importance of giving representatives a 
high degree of autonomy.   
  In the case of COREPER and the Council Working groups, the member state 
representatives act as ‘agents,’ representing their member state within the decision-making 
process of the EU.  However, the member states are not unitary actors.  In this analysis, I thus 
treat the various Ministers who make up the government as the principals.  They each have their 
own interests, and depending on the issue area, oversee different decisions taken by their 
member state representatives.   
  In addition, bargaining among the EU member states within COREPER takes place 
across many directives and issues which vary on the alternative explanations of interest here.  
Examining a general argument that holds in general within COREPER across these different 
directives, and therefore these alternative explanations, helps to give support to the theory 
presented here.  If this theory holds in this more general evaluation, a more explicit research 
design which specifically addresses these alternative explanations will be warranted.   
The importance of constraining state representatives in an EU context has been 
demonstrated by previous literature (e.g. Slapin 2006).  I therefore briefly demonstrate that these 
previous literatures examine competitive, rather than cooperative bargaining, and therefore, that 
their findings lend empirical support for Hypothesis 2.  I then take to task the importance of 
empirically demonstrating the more counter-intuitive argument presented by Hypothesis 1 – that 
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in cooperative bargaining, giving agents autonomy is important for the fulfillment of principals’ 
interests in bargaining agreements.   
VIII. Agential Constraint in Competitive Bargaining 
Current literatures examining international bargaining often argue for the importance of 
constraining negotiations’ actions and choices.  In particular, it is argued that a state whose 
representatives’ actions and choices are constrained within the decision-making process gains 
greater bargaining power and leverage, and will thus have their interests better represented in 
bargained outcomes (e.g. Putnam 1988; Hosli 2000; König and Hug 2000; Hug and König 2002; 
Slapin 2006).   
The importance of constraining representative ‘agents’ to maximize one’s interests, 
which is highlighted by this IR bargaining power literature is further emphasized within the 
political science literature more generally, as it is a central component and focus of canonical 
principal-agent arguments: given that agents have their own interests, sometimes conflicting with 
the interests of the principal they represent, the constraint of agents’ actions by the principals is 
important for maximizing principals’ interests (Pratt and Zeckhauser 1984; Downs and Rocke 
1994; Macho-Stadler and Pérez-Castrillo 2001; Pollack 2003).   
The important role that constraining negotiators plays in furthering member state interests 
has been made, in particular, in studies examining bargaining in the EU context.  Importantly, 
though, these studies are often focused on bargaining within competitive bargaining processes.  
Therefore, their predictions are consistent with Hypothesis 2 of the argument made here. 
Important examples of this argument include Hug and König (2002), arguing that member states 
with higher domestic ratification constraints were better able to eliminate undesirable issues at 
the Amsterdam Intergovernmental Conference (IGC) than member states with lower domestic   27 
ratification constraints; and Slapin (2006) who argues that member states with difficult 
parliamentary ratification pivots tended to perform well at the IGCs leading into the Treaty of 
Amsterdam.   
In these papers – and other works like them – the case being examined is an 
intergovernmental conference over the construction of a new Treaty for the EU.  In particular, 
both of these main works which examine this agential constraint argument in the EU context 
examine the bargaining over the creation of the Amsterdam Treaty – a case which is dominated 
by a competitive, rather than cooperative bargaining process.   
As has been argued and demonstrated in literature examining these IGCs in general, they 
are empirically dominated by bargaining power (e.g. Moravcsik 1998) and threats of reversion to 
the status quo (i.e. veto threats) (e.g. König and Hug 2000; Dür and Mateo 2006).
17   In addition, 
Slapin (2006) argues that the IGCs leading into the adoption of the Amsterdam Treaty, in 
particular, were dominated by bargaining power and these types of characteristics (Slapin 2006).   
These characteristics embody what I argue are the empirical indicators of “competitive 
bargaining” processes.  Therefore, the precise cases used to demonstrate the bargaining power 
and increased interest reflection in bargaining outcomes that stems from constraining negotiators 
are bargains characterized by competitive bargaining.   These case therefore provide support for 
the second hypothesis presented here. 
The more counter-intuitive aspect of this argument, though, needs to be more carefully 
examined.  In particular, negotiations that take place within the EU institutional structure, in 
particular in the Committee of Permanent Representatives (COREPER) have been argued and 
                                                            
17 König and Hug (2000) argue that in the negotiation of the Maastricht Treaty the ratification phase was used (to 
varying degrees) as a veto threat in the bargaining process (König and Hug 2000, 102).  Dür and Mateo (2006) who 
argue that EU IGCs in general are characterized by demands backed by credible threats and the threat of the veto 
(Dür and Mateo 2006, 384). 
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empirically demonstrated to possess bargaining processes different from the types of competitive 
processes highlighted above (e.g. Lewis 1998; 2002; 2005).  I will therefore, first, demonstrate 
that this institution is a setting in which principal controls exist, as well as one which is largely 
characterized by what I have defined here as “cooperative bargaining” processes.  Therefore, 
COREPER is an institutional setting in which I argue that agent autonomy (rather than 
constraint) should lead to the maximization of member state interests in EU decision-making 
outcomes. 
IX. Agent autonomy in Cooperative Bargaining 
IX.A. Context of Principals’ Controls 
The first control mechanism that member states possess is the power of appointment.  
The member states alone control appointments and there is no approval process in Brussels.  The 
average appointment is five years, longer than the three- or four-year diplomatic appointments, 
but several permanent representatives have remained in COREPER for a decade or more.  This 
length of tenure does lessen the impact of control that member states can exert over their 
permanent representatives.   
Despite the inability of the power of appointment to exert absolute control over 
permanent representatives, it does act as a method that can be used to exercise a degree of 
control.  The process of appointment, as a first stage of control over representatives’ actions, has 
the effect of creating a sense of responsibility to their member states – a knowledge that their job 
is to represent the member state interest.  “We need to be representatives of our governments.  If 
we fail to be that, we’ll get fired” (Interview with Permanent Representative, May, 2006). 
The most important form of member state control is the instruction process. The 
provision of instructions provides a benchmark against which to evaluate the outcomes of the   29 
actions of member state representatives to ensure that they do not forward their own interests at 
the expense of those of their member states.  Permanent representatives do receive instructions 
from their national capitals and they are expected to act in the interest of the member states.  As 
one deputy permanent representative described, “Usually there is not a single dossier on which I 
do not have the input of the capital” (Interview with Deputy Permanent Representative, May, 
2005).   
  To ensure deputy permanent representatives’ compliance with these instructions, member 
states use the essential control of accountability.  This accountability is first present in the 
reporting process.  Representatives in COREPER are expected to be in constant communication 
with their capital.  All those interviewed described strict rules for reporting and transmitting 
information to their capital.  These reporting rules range from rules about specific reporting time 
periods to specific formats for reports.  In addition to reporting, all members of the permanent 
representations engage in phone calls, emails, teleconferences and other kinds of daily contacts 
with their capital.  “We have to be in constant dialogue with [the capital], and explain what is 
happening” (Interview with Permanent Representative, June, 2006).  As one deputy permanent 
representative described, 
[We are] always on permanent communication with [the capital].  Officially, through reporting, but also, 
[we are] always on the phone.  We even have teleconference facilities with the capital if it’s needed.  It’s 
life, you can say (Interview with Deputy Permanent Representative, May, 2005). 
 
In addition, the arguments forged in COREPER must also be approved at the Ministerial 
level.  “Even an agreement which has been found at the COREPER level still has to be adopted 
formally as an A-point by Ministers.  Of course, most of the time this is an automatic thing.  But 
I just mean that every decision, whether it’s taken at the working group level or the COREPER 
level, in the end will have to be approved, even if it’s only a formality, by the Ministerial level” 
(Interview with Mertens Counselor, May, 2005).   30 
The possibility exists, therefore, for a minister to undo a deal made at the COREPER level.   
A minister can always make a declaration on an A-point and always ask for an A-point to be taken off the 
list and become a B-point later on (Interview with Mertens Counselor May, 2005). 
 
Examples of this are extremely rare, but permanent representatives who are overruled by 
their ministers would quickly lose credibility both within COREPER and within their member 
state (Lewis 2002).  If a permanent representative negotiates a deal within COREPER that 
departs from his or her instructions, he or she is still expected to “deliver” the member state.  
Decisions that depart too far from the instructions of the national capital can be rejected by the 
member state.  This would also damage the credibility of the permanent representative both in 
his or her ability to negotiate within COREPER and within his or her member state to negotiate 
on its behalf. 
Prudent members of COREPER will ensure that these [collective decisions] are agreed [to] by capitals (and 
imprudent members of COREPER will not be around for long (Bostock 2002, 222). 
 
  This analysis demonstrates that the institutional relationship between member state 
representatives in COREPER and their respective member states fits the structure of a principal-
agent relationship.  Thus, the deputy permanent representatives of the member states can be 
understood as ‘agents,’ who are granted a degree of autonomy within the decision-making 
process of the European Union, but also have controls exerted over them by their member states 
to prevent this autonomy from being used to forward the agents’ interests at the expense of the 
interests of their member state.   
In this institutional setting, therefore, I would expect that given these principal controls, 
in cooperative bargaining interactions, agent autonomy, rather than constraint, will lead to the 
maximization of principals’ interests.  It is the demonstration of this argument that I take to task 
in the remainder of this paper.  I first demonstrate that “cooperative bargaining” is largely   31 
present in COREPER.  I then draw on interview evidence to demonstrate the importance of 
autonomy for forwarding member state interests in these cooperative bargaining processes. 
IX.B. Cooperative Bargaining in COREPER 
  An important first step in evaluating Hypothesis 1 of the theory presented here is to 
demonstrate that negotiations in COREPER are, for the most part, characterized by 
“cooperative” rather than “competitive” bargaining processes, and thus an empirical setting in 
which the theory presented here would expect hypothesis 1 to hold.  In order to evaluate this 
institutional setting, and the autonomy and bargaining strategies adopted by the member state 
representatives, sixty-six interviews were conducted in the Summers of 2005 and 2006.  These 
interviews were conducted with Deputy Permanent Representatives and Mertens Counselors 
involved with COREPER I, Permanent Representatives and Antici Counselors involved with 
COREPER II, and in some cases, Working Group representatives who sat in and took part in 
COERPER negotiations.  In addition, individuals from the Commission and Council Secretariat 
who were involved with COREPER negotiations were also interviewed.   
  Importantly, this interview evidence first provided evidence in support of the argument 
made by Jeffrey Lewis (Lewis 1998; Lewis 2000; Lewis 2005) that within COREPER 
competitive bargaining processes are not the standard mode of interaction.  In addition, these 
interviews provided evidence that these bargaining processes are, in fact, largely consist with 
“cooperative bargaining” processes, as defined here.   
First, these interviews yielded evidence of the prioritization of issues in a given bargain 
“so that those of lesser priority can be traded for those of greater importance” (Interview with 
Deputy Permanent Representative in COREPER I, May 15, 2006).  This type of prioritization 
can, and sometimes does occur in the capital.  Often, though, the member state representative   32 
play an important role in informing the capital that prioritization is necessary (Interview with 
Deputy Permanent Representative in COREPER I, May, 2005) or in pointing out to the capital 
what the particular issues of concern are among the various member states in a given bargain, 
and therefore what they should focus on in their prioritization (Interview with Deputy Permanent 
Representative in COREPER I, June, 2005).   
  This “prioritization” provides evidence for the potential for cooperative bargaining, but 
not of the existence of cooperative bargaining itself.  Given that issues in a given bargain are 
weighted according to their importance to a principal’s interests, the potential therefore exists for 
the negotiating agents to offer concessions (i.e. make Pareto-improving offers to other member 
states) on issues of lesser importance.   
  Most importantly, then, the interviews conducted with these COREPER participants 
provide evidence that these types of offers do occur and are, in fact, the “norm” in COREPER 
interactions based on these prioritizations of the issues.  As one deputy permanent representative 
from one of the larger, EU-15 member states explained, 
If they, [the capital], don’t prioritize, it is the person in the chair who either decides not to negotiate on all 
the instructions; or it is you who while, of course, performing your instructions because you have to, 
nevertheless choose to put more weight on something than on something else, and then perhaps achieve a 
result on those particular issues [while giving on the others] (Interview with Deputy Permanent 
Representative in COREPER I, May 2005). 
 
This sentiment and argument was shared and made not only by the member state 
representatives of the EU-15, but was reiterated and accentuated by member state representatives 
from the “less socialized” accession countries less than a year after joining the Union.   
A general rule, or technique – what is taking place in decision-making in the Council is compromise.  It’s 
the key word – compromise.  And in compromise, you always should give up something.  You should 
always.  And it’s not at all easy.  It’s not at all easy to give up different things, different issues (Interview 
with Deputy Permanent Representative in COREPER I, May 2005).   
 
  This idea of compromise and being “giving” on particular issues is the central tenet of 
what was defined here as a “cooperative bargaining” process.  These features of bargaining were   33 
highlighted by all COREPER participants – both old and new – as a norm in the interactions 
within this institutional setting.  This does not mean that there do not exist occasional exceptions 
to this norm, but this “cooperative bargaining” is a defining general feature of these interactions, 
and deviations from this stand our and are viewed as abnormal within COREPER.  As one 
Deputy Permanent Representative summarized, “the Union is a place where you give and take, 
and you cannot take all the time” (Interview with Deputy Permanent Representative, May 2005).   
Therefore, COREPER is an important institutional setting in which to analyze the main 
counterintuitive argument forwarded by this project – that in these “cooperative” bargaining 
processes, agent autonomy will lead to the maximization of principals’ interests.  I will therefore 
evaluate the empirical plausibility of Hypothesis 1, demonstrating how, in this context, agent 
autonomy, rather than constraint, furthers the representation of principals’ interests overall in 
cooperative bargaining processes. 
IX.C. Autonomy and Cooperative Bargaining in COREPER 
I argue that within the cooperative bargaining processes that are largely characteristic of 
COREPER negotiations, member state interests will be best reflected in bargaining outcomes 
when their representatives in COREPER have a degree of autonomy.  On the other hand, the 
interests of member states whose representatives are tightly constrained will not be as well 
represented in the agreements reached in these negotiations processes.  I further argue that 
autonomy and constraint exert these effects via two main mechanisms within these cooperative 
bargaining processes – their effect on the provision of information and on the ability to offer 
concessions.   
The next section draws upon the interviews conducted with COREPER participants to 
demonstrate the importance of autonomy for the provision of information as well as for the   34 
ability to credibly offer concessions – and thus to receive concessions as well.  In doing so, I also 
demonstrate that these strategies are important in order to have member state interests taken into 
account in decision-making outcomes, and the difficulties created by tight constraints over these 
bargaining agents.  I then provide a very brief illustrative example of this logic at work in the 
case of the Services Directive.   
IX.C.1. Autonomy and Strategies to Maximize Member State Interests 
The interviews conducted with COREPER participants first demonstrated the importance 
of sharing information for success in COREPER negotiations and the necessity of autonomy to 
do so.  As one Mertens counselor argued, 
You have to understand why it’s important for [another member state] to get ‘if appropriate’ somewhere in 
the text.  You have to understand, otherwise you can’t draft.  If you don’t know what they mean and why 
they want to have a change in the text, you can’t negotiate (Interview June 2005).   
 
The main forum in which this information exchange can proceed in the COREPER 
setting is via informal, bilateral negotiations.  These types of informal contacts are important, 
first, because time constraints on the formal negotiation process prevent all the information and 
negotiating exchanges necessary to reach an agreement from being able to take place within this 
formal setting.   
If you have an issue, on which each and every member state has an opinion – and this is usually so on 
legislation – if each [representative] takes five minutes each to explain [his/her] position once around the 
table, plus the interpretation, the introduction of the Presidency, the Commission, etc. brings you to a time 
of 2 to 3 hours, in which Ministers exchange views only once, and you haven’t even started the real 
negotiation.  So if you want to treat [several] dossiers in every meeting, they have to be prepared; they have 
to be “precooked” to an extent that quick decisions can be taken.  Otherwise the system of decisions by 
Council will collapse (Interview with Deputy Permanent Representative, May, 2005).    
 
Informal meetings among COREPER representatives are therefore central to the reaching 
of agreements within this institution.  As one Working Group representative described the 
negotiation process leading up to an agreement reached while he held the Presidency position,  
When we started [on this directive], there were 180 footnotes.  When we got it adopted, they had all been 
lifted so it could be adopted.  We spent about 100 hours on this formally…ten full day working group 
meetings, or maybe 11, three COREPER meetings and one Council.  The Council only dealt with this   35 
matter for about one hour.  But I spent personally, 800 hours on top of that with informal preparation and 
negotiation.  And it was about challenging the delegations about their position, proposing compromises, 
having lunch with delegations and coffee, sending them proposals by mail, having meetings with the 
Commission, having meetings with the Council Secretariat who is helping in this process, and also meeting 
with lobby groups that have an interest in this proposal.  And also make sure that the final text that we then 
were going [forward with] was supported (Interview with Working Group representative, June 5, 2005).   
 
Most importantly, though, while negotiating agents recognize the need to exchange 
information about the interests they represent in order to reach agreements in cooperative 
bargaining processes, their negotiation experience allows them to recognize the potential 
weakening of their bargaining position that may stem from revealing this information.  They 
therefore do not reveal this information without consideration of the context and setting in which 
they do so.   
In the COREPER context, this is especially true.  There are often experts from different 
areas present at the formal meetings.  Given that these experts consistently deal with the same 
types of issues, and may deal with them in future competitive bargaining contexts, COREPER 
representatives do not necessarily want them knowing the exact interests of their member state 
on a given issue (Interview with Mertens Counselor, June, 2005).  In addition, some “official” 
positions dictated by the capitals stem from problems of coordination or politics within a federal 
system or coalition government.  Revealing such information about internal difficulties to all 
COREPER participants may again weaken the negotiating position of the member state within 
the EU overall.   
These problems, though, are not as significant of an issue in bilateral, informal and 
private exchanges.  “In bilateral negotiations, representatives can talk candidly about all these 
things. … They allow for the exchange of information about your real position, your real 
problems, and your real priorities” (Interview with Permanent Representative, June 2006).     36 
However, while these bilateral and informal exchanges are extremely important and 
central to the cooperative bargaining processes taking place within COREPER, in these informal 
meetings, “there are no real rules or procedures, and there are no specific instructions” (Interview 
with Working Group Representative, May, 2005).  As several member state representatives 
described, these informal meetings are “of course, based on the opinion of the capitals we 
represent”.  However, in order to reach successful outcomes and have other delegations take the 
interests a representative is forward into account, sharing information – especially information 
that the capital does not want publicly revealed – is an extremely important step.  
Representatives therefore have to have the autonomy and flexibility in choosing their strategies 
to be able to do so.   
In addition to its important role in the exchange of information for cooperative 
bargaining, autonomy is necessary for representative to be able to offer concessions on particular 
issues in a bargain.  As described by all those interviewed, autonomy allows for the adoption of 
these types of strategies in two central ways related to the different ways that autonomy can be 
empirically operationalized.   
First, autonomy in the most straightforward sense can be understood as having flexibility 
in the instructions received.  Most often in the COREPER context, this involves instructions 
which have provide a “framework” for negotiating.  As one Deputy Permanent Representative 
described, “We take a subject and say, OK, the disposition on this and this subject is X.  And 
within that framework, I have maximum leeway to get to the best possible position for my 
country.  And how I get there is not so much of interest to them” (Interview with Deputy 
Permanent Representative in COREPER I, May 11, 2006).  This type of “framework instruction” 
allow member state representatives to assess the overall interests of their member state and   37 
pursue the issues most central to those interests, while offering concessions on the issues given 
less priority.  This is a first way that autonomy can be important for being able to offer 
concessions on particular issues.   
I do not allow for detailed instructions from home.  They’re not saying, for example, well, on actually 
Article 16.3 you have to do this and this and this.  No, that is for me.  I know where I have to end up, and if 
I want to give to [another member state] this particular concession, then [the capital has] to give me that 
little bit.  I’m the one who’s negotiating this, and [they] have to trust me that I’ll get the best result as 
possible (Interview with Permanent Representative in COREPER II, May 18, 2006).  
 
Second, autonomy in the sense of having input into one’s instructions can be used to 
communicate to their member state principals the need to give on a particular issue in order to 
achieve a beneficial agreement overall.  The importance of this type of autonomy is empirically 
demonstrated in the illustrative example given below.  The deputy permanent representative 
from one particular member state had to “convince” his capital to offer a concession to the other 
negotiating coalition on the screening clause, arguing that this was the “price” necessary to 
achieve an agreement.  That he had the autonomy to do so was an important facet of the reaching 
of this agreement.   
In addition, in COREPER, without being able to have the autonomy to offer concessions 
in these ways, representatives who are highly constrained are often unable to adopt the strategies, 
which they recognize from their negotiating experience, to be necessary for best forwarding their 
member state’s interests.  As one Mertens Counselor described, “Other countries respect that on 
certain issues it is important for another country, and they give more flexibility on that issue.  
And if [our country] wants to get this kind of flexibilty on the issues that are most important to 
[us], then we have to also respect other countries when it’s an important issue for them.  That is 
more respected and accepted than when a country rejects everything in all the dossiers” 
(Interview with Mertens Counselor in CORPEER I, May 22, 2006).     38 
In this way, this interview evidence provides preliminary support for the theory presented 
here which argues that in cooperative bargaining processes, rather than constraining agents, 
giving them a degree of autonomy will lead to the maximization of member state interests.  A 
brief example of the negotiation which took place on the Services Directive in the Spring of 2006 
provides an illustration of this logic at work in a real case of bargaining within COREPER.   
IX.C.2. Example of the Services Directive 
The bargaining on the highly politicized directive on the “Freedom of Establishment for 
Service Providers and Free Movement of Services” (Directive 2006/123/EC), hereafter referred 
to as the “Services directive”, provides an important illustrative example of cooperative 
bargaining at work in COREPER and the central role that autonomy played in allowing the 
exchange of information among the member state representatives as well as in the offering of 
concessions.   
After the second proposal from the Commission, the more liberal member states – which 
included a large majority of the newer accession states – were unhappy with the replacement of 
the “country of origin” principle with the “freedom to provide services” principle
18 – arguing that 
it did not remove to a satisfactory degree the barriers to the provision of services in another 
member state.  
In order to accommodate the view of the new member states, a new Article 41 was 
proposed concerning screening of legislation, which should be a substitute for the fact that there 
was no longer a “country of origin” principle.  “This article introduced to this the application that 
the member states should screen all the legislation they have that could be a barrier to free 
                                                            
18 The “country of origin” principle stated that service providers in other member players would be subject to the 
rules and regulations not of the country in which they were providing services, but of the country which they came.  
The “freedom to provide services” lays out the conditions under which member states have to allow services 
providers to provide their services, and service recipients to receive them.  The service provides, under this 
regulation, would be required to follow the regulations of the country in which services were provided.   39 
movement of services.  They also included a notification procedure.  And this was the price to 
the new member states to accept the text as it was” (Interview with Competition Working Group 
representative, May 31, 2006).   
This screening procedure was difficult for several member states to accept, including the 
more powerful states, France and Germany.  However, rather than pushing through the 
legislation as it was, one of these member state representatives described, “[Our capital] was 
totally opposed to this transparency/screening clause at the beginning. … [But] we managed to 
make [our capital] understand that this was the price to pay [for the agreement on the new text], 
and that it was not too high a price” (Interview with Deputy Permanent Representative in 
COREPER I, June 6, 2006).  Thus, these two groups willingly “gave” on particular issues – the 
new and more liberal member states “gave” and accepted for the other member states the 
“freedom to provide services” principle, while the member states in support of this principle 
“gave” on the screening procedure.   
What is interesting and important in this example is that in addition to demonstrating that 
these member states engaged in agreeing to Pareto-optimal issues for the opposing member 
states, they did so in a situation which could have just as easily been characterized by 
competitive bargaining.  Given the QMV decision rule, the newer member states could have 
forged a blocking minority and threatened to veto if they did not achieve their goals, as they were 
extremely close to possessing a blocking minority.  In addition, the other member states could 
have taken the go-it-along power they possessed given that the newer member states did not 
possess a precise blocking minority to push through the legislation without the screening 
procedure.  This case therefore provides an important illustrative example of the adoption of 
“cooperative” rather than “competitive” bargaining within COREPER.   40 
The importance of autonomy can be illustrated in this example of cooperative bargaining.  
First, the importance of providing information about the underlying interests of the newer 
member states was highlighted in the bargaining over the screening clause.  As described by the 
Deputy Permanent Representative who had to argue with his capital to accept this clause, 
because the representative who was ‘rallying’ the newer member states met with him and 
described to him the reasoning and interests underlying the need for this screening procedure, “it 
was, for me, easier to understand really what they wanted, and the importance of this 
transparency/screening clause to which [my capital] was totally opposed at the beginning” 
(Interview with Deputy Permanent Representative, June 6, 2006).  He was then able to use that 
information to argue to his capital to accept, and “give” on the screening clause.  “That is the 
usefulness of these discussions.” 
Furthermore, autonomy was necessary for each of these various member states to “give” 
on the respective issues.  To “give” on these issues went against the instructions given to these 
representatives on each of these issues.  But at the end, what was achieved was a directive which 
both sides argued were largely consistent with their central concerns (Interview with Deputy 
Permanent Representatives May and June 2006), and which was in fact, not voted against by any 
of the capitals in the Council vote
19.   
Autonomy was therefore an important factor in the largely cooperative bargaining 
process which took place during the Spring of 2006 on the Services Directive.  This autonomy 
was central for the sharing of information and offering of concessions which helped to bring 
about an agreement which was largely consistent with the interests of all member states – despite 
their fairly disparate interests in approaching this highly politicized directive.   
 
                                                            
19 Two capitals did abstain, but did not vote against the directive.   41 
X. Conclusion 
  The case of COREPER provides some preliminary evidence for a more nuanced 
understanding of the connection between the principal-agent relationship between negotiators 
and those on whose behalf they negotiate.  In particular, rather than always tightly constraining 
these agents, this project provides some support for the argument that the degree of constraint 
exerted over negotiating agents will best maximize a principals’ interests when that constraint is 
exerted in competitive bargaining process, but not in cooperative bargaining processes.   
  In addition, as demonstrated by the argument made here, different types of bargaining 
processes exert potentially important effects on the types of bargaining strategies which will lead 
to a greater reflection of one’s interests in the agreements reached.  Given the potential 
mitigating effect of the character of the bargaining interaction on the strategies and the way that 
interests are connected to bargained outcomes, this project therefore also argues and provides 
evidence in support of the need for a better understanding and consideration of the character of 
the bargaining process taking place – both theoretically and empirically.   
The empirical example given here, though, is only a first and rough step in demonstrating 
this argument.  In particular, though COREPER is arguably largely characterized by cooperative 
bargaining, there is likely variation in bargaining processes across different directives.  
Therefore, a next step will be to examine specific directives negotiated in COREPER which 
capture the different empirical combinations of the alternative explanations of interest and 
different bargaining processes, and connecting each member state representatives degree of 
autonomy on that particular directive to the outcomes that result.   
Therefore, while this study has provided preliminary and illustrative evidence in support 
of this argument, these next will provide a more substantial empirical evaluation of the argument   42 
made here.  This research program therefore has several important contributions, but also several 
steps for future research, and a more complete empirical evaluation of the arguments about the 
character of the bargaining interaction and its implications for bargaining in general, including 
principal-agent relationships.   
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